



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Ayah M Abdelhadi
DOCKET NO.: 19-34058.001-R-1 through 19-34058.002-R-1
PARCEL NO.: See Below

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Ayah M Abdelhadi, the appellant(s), by attorney Jessica Hill-Magiera, Attorney at Law in Lake Zurich; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented in this matter, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds **No Change** in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

DOCKET NO	PARCEL NUMBER	LAND	IMPRVMT	TOTAL
19-34058.001-R-1	28-17-402-047-1028	1,290	6,465	\$ 7,755
19-34058.002-R-1	28-17-402-047-1040	81	409	\$ 490

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) after receiving a decision from the Cook County Board of Review. The instant appeal challenges the assessment for tax year 2019. The Property Tax Appeal Board (the "Board") finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of this appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject consists of a condominium unit and a deeded parking space with a 2.8069% total ownership interest in the common elements. The property is located in Bremen Township, Cook County. The subject is classified as a class 2-99 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of this argument, the appellant submitted information on two units in the subject's building, or 5.2798% of ownership in the common elements, that sold between May 2018 and February 2019 for an aggregate price of \$158,000. The appellant also submitted information on three sale comparables located outside the subject's condominium building. These units sold between February 2018 and September 2018 for an aggregate price of \$206,500. The appellant also submitted evidence disclosing the subject property was purchased on February 5, 2018 for a price of \$72,500. The settlement

statement submitted by the appellant states that the seller was “Fannie Mae a/k/a Federal National Mortgage Association.” The PTAX-203 form submitted by the appellant states that the subject is not the appellant’s principal residence, and, therefore, it is not owner-occupied. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject’s assessment to \$7,250.

The board of review submitted its “Board of Review Notes on Appeal” disclosing that the total assessment for the subject is \$8,245. The subject’s assessment reflects a market value of \$82,450 when applying the 2019 statutory level of assessment for class 2 property of 10.00% under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

In support of its contention of the correct assessment the board of review submitted a condominium analysis showing that 25 units in the subject’s building, or 36.1479% of ownership in the common elements, sold between June 2016 and July 2019 for an aggregate price of \$1,063,154. The aggregate sale price was then divided by the percentage of ownership interest in the common elements of the units sold to arrive at a total market value for the building of \$2,941,122.

In rebuttal, the appellant reaffirmed the evidence previously submitted.

Conclusion of Law

The appellant contends the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal, the value of the property must be proven by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales, or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof, and a reduction in the subject’s assessment is not warranted.

“Real property taxes . . . which are authorized by law to be assessed against and levied upon real property shall be assessed against and levied upon each unit and the owner’s corresponding percentage of ownership in the common elements as a tract, and not upon the property as a whole.” 765 ILCS 605/10(a).

The Board finds that the sale of the subject in February 2018 for a price of \$72,500 is a “compulsory sale.” A “compulsory sale” is defined as:

- (i) the sale of real estate for less than the amount owed to the mortgage lender or mortgagor, if the lender or mortgagor has agreed to the sale, commonly referred to as a “short sale” and (ii) the first sale of real estate owned by a financial institution as a result of a judgment of foreclosure, transfer pursuant to a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or consent judgment, occurring after the foreclosure proceeding is complete.

35 ILCS 200/1-23. The Board finds that the sale of the subject in February 2018 for a price of \$72,500 is a compulsory sale, in the form of a foreclosure, based on the settlement statement submitted by the appellant, which states that Fannie Mae was the seller. See 12 U.S.C. §1723a(a) (authorizing Fannie Mae to acquire property in the event of a default or a foreclosure);

Kimbrell v. Fed. Hous. Fin. Agency, 682 F. App'x. 486, 487 (7th Cir. 2017) (stating that Fannie Mae foreclosed upon a property located in Peoria, Illinois). See generally, Fed. Nat'l Mortg. Ass'n v. City of Chi., 2017 WL 4875785, 1 (7th Cir. 2017) (“When a borrower defaults, . . . Fannie Mae . . . forecloses and takes title to the real estate securing the loan.”).

Finding that the sale of the subject was a compulsory sale, the question then becomes whether the compulsory sale of the subject is an arm's-length transaction such that the sale price reflects the subject's fair cash value. Indeed, “a contemporaneous sale between parties dealing at arm's-length is not only relevant to the question of fair cash market value, [citations] but would be practically conclusive on the issue of whether an assessment was at full value.” People ex rel. Korzen v. Belt Ry. Co. of Chicago, 37 Ill.2d 158, 161 (1967). However, “[i]n order for the sale price of property to be used as the market value, the transaction must be between a willing buyer and a willing seller, neither of whom are under compulsion to buy or sell, and no account should be taken of values or necessities peculiar to either party.” Id. at 164 (citing City of Chicago v. Harrison-Halsted Building Corp., 11 Ill.2d 431 (1957); Ligare v. Chicago, Madison and Northern Railroad Co., 166 Ill. 249 (1897); and City of Chicago v. Farwell, 286 Ill. 415 (1918), overruled on other grounds by Forest Preserve Dist. of Du Page County v. First Nat. Bank of Franklin Park, 2011 IL 110759). The appellant asserts that the sale of the subject was an arm's-length transaction, while the board of review contends that it is not.

In Calumet Transfer LLC v. Property Tax Appeal Bd., 401 Ill.App.3d 652 (1st Dist. 2010), the court upheld the Board's decision, wherein the Board allowed the intervenor to challenge the arm's-length nature of the sale of the property, through the submission of sale comparables, pursuant to Section 1910.65(c)(4) of the Official Rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board. Calumet Transfer, 401 Ill.App.3d at 655-56; 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c)(4) (“[p]roof of the market value of the subject property may consist of the following: 4) documentation of not fewer than three recent sales of suggested comparable properties together with documentation of the similarity, proximity and lack of distinguishing characteristics of the sales comparables to the subject property.”). Like the board of review here, the intervenor in Calumet Transfer argued that the seller was under duress to sell the property, and, therefore, the purchase price was below fair market value as evidenced by the comparable sales. Id. at 656. The court stated that, “There is no provision in the Property Tax Code that restricts [the Board's] authority to consider such evidence. To the contrary, paragraph (4) of section 1910.65(c) specifically allows evidence of comparable property sales to prove fair market value.” Id.

The Board finds the best evidence of market value to be the board of review's sale comparables with the PINs ending in -1003 and -1067, and the sale comparables with the PINs ending in -1002 and -1009, which were submitted by both parties. The appellant's sale comparables that were located outside of the subject's building were accorded no weight in the Board's analysis. In taking the aggregate sales price of the most similar sales (\$274,017) and dividing by the total percentage of ownership in the common elements of the units sold (8.0867%), the Board finds that the subject's building has a market value of \$3,388,490. Multiplying this market value by the subject's percentage of ownership in the common elements of 2.8069% results in a market value for the subject of \$95,112. The subject's sale price is \$72,500, which is below the market value shown by the best comparables in the record. Therefore, the Board finds that the compulsory sale of the subject in February 2018 for a price of \$72,500 was below the subject's fair market value, and, therefore, was not an arm's-length transaction. As such, this sale has

been given no weight in the Board's analysis. Additionally, the subject's current assessment reflects a market value of \$82,450, which is below the market value established by the most similar sale comparables in the record. Since there is no other market value evidence proffered by the appellant, the Board finds that the appellant has not proven, by a preponderance of the evidence, that the subject is overvalued, and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code. Pursuant to Section 1910.50(d) of the rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board (86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.50(d)) the proceeding before the Property Tax Appeal Board is terminated when the decision is rendered. The Property Tax Appeal Board does not require any motion or request for reconsideration.



Chairman



Member



Member



Member



Member

DISSENTING: _____

CERTIFICATION

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date:

May 16, 2023



Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year or years of the same general assessment period, as provided in Sections 9-125 through 9-225, are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for such subsequent year or years directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR OR YEARS. A separate petition and evidence must be filed for each of the remaining years of the general assessment period.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.

PARTIES OF RECORD

AGENCY

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