

## FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

| APPELLANT:  | John Mataitis    |
|-------------|------------------|
| DOCKET NO.: | 17-04966.001-R-1 |
| PARCEL NO.: | 06-21-179-027    |

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are John Mataitis, the appellant; and the DeKalb County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented in this matter, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds <u>no change</u> in the assessment of the property as established by the **DeKalb** County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

| LAND:  | \$9,173  |
|--------|----------|
| IMPR.: | \$80,031 |
| TOTAL: | \$89,204 |

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

#### **Statement of Jurisdiction**

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the DeKalb County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2017 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

### **Findings of Fact**

The subject property consists of a one-story dwelling of brick and vinyl exterior construction with 2,336 square feet of living area. The dwelling was constructed in 2005. Features of the home include a full unfinished basement, central air conditioning, a fireplace and a 682-square foot garage. The property has a 11,326-square foot site and is located in Sycamore, Sycamore Township, DeKalb County.

The appellant appeared before the Property Tax Appeal Board contending improvement assessment inequity as the basis of the appeal. In support of this argument, the appellant submitted information on eleven equity comparables which were reported to be located from 4 blocks to 2.9 miles away from the subject property. Three comparables are located in the same subdivision as the subject property. The comparables are described as one-story single-family dwellings of brick and vinyl exterior construction ranging in size from 2,010 to 3,131 square feet of living area. The dwellings were constructed from 2002 to 2013. Each dwelling features a full

basement with two having a finished area.<sup>1</sup> Each dwelling also has central air conditioning, one or two fireplaces and a garage ranging in size from 576 to 1,000 square feet of building area. The properties have improvement assessments ranging from \$43,135 to \$90,932 or from \$21.46 to \$32.17 per square foot of living area. The appellant also submitted property record cards for the subject property and his eleven comparables along with Community Online Map Property and Search Site (C.O.M.P.A.S.) property information regarding the subject and each of the eleven comparables.

The appellant, John Mataitis, testified regarding the eleven comparables which he submitted into evidence. Mataitis noted the similarities between his property and each of the eleven comparables. Mataitis argued that his improvement assessment is higher than each of the eleven comparable dwellings on a per square foot basis. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject's total assessment.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$89,204. The subject property has an improvement assessment of \$80,031 or \$34.26 per square foot of living area.

In support of its contention of the correct assessment, the board of review submitted information on four equity comparables located in the same subdivision and surrounding the same lake as the subject property. The comparables are improved with one-story single-family dwellings of vinyl and brick exterior construction ranging in size from 2,043 to 2,476 square feet of living area. The dwellings were constructed in 2005 or 2006. Each comparable features a full unfinished basement, central air-conditioning, a fireplace and a garage ranging in size from 715 to 816 square feet of building area. The comparables have improvement assessments ranging from \$73,153 to \$83,590 or from \$33.76 to \$35.81 per square foot of living area.

Appearing on behalf of the DeKalb County Board of Review before the Property Tax Appeal Board was Chairman John Guio along with their witness Chief County Assessment Officer, Robin Brunschon. Brunschon testified regarding the evidence she prepared on behalf of the board of review. Brunschon noted that three of the four board of review's comparables are located along the same lake as the subject property and the fourth comparable is virtually on the lake. Bruschon argued that the board of review's four comparables more closely resemble the subject property in location and features than the appellant's comparables. Based on this evidence, the board of review requested confirmation of the subject's improvement assessment.

Under cross examination, Brunschon testified that the entire neighborhood (which includes multiple subdivisions) was re-assessed in 2017 which explains the difference in the subject's decrease in land assessment and increase in improvement assessment when compared to the prior year's assessments. Brunschon acknowledged that two board of review comparables have a slightly lower improvement assessment than the subject, however, she argued that the most similar comparables bracket the subject.

<sup>&</sup>lt;sup>1</sup> Appellant's grid did not disclose information about the comparables' basements nor neighborhood. However, the Board has obtained this information from the property record cards submitted by the appellant.

In rebuttal, the appellant, Mataitis, testified regarding the rules of the DeKalb County board of review as it relates to comparable properties. Mataitis contended that the DeKalb County rules require him to limit his comparables to only those in the subject's subdivision which are in close proximity to the subject property. Mataitis argued that this precluded him from searching outside of his neighborhood to find comparable properties in support of his appeal. Mataitis further contended that this rule is prejudicial to taxpayers in limiting the number of available comparable properties.

### **Conclusion of Law**

The taxpayer contends assessment inequity as the basis of the appeal. When unequal treatment in the assessment process is the basis of the appeal, the inequity of the assessments must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of unequal treatment in the assessment process should consist of documentation of the assessments for the assessment year in question of not less than three comparable properties showing the similarity, proximity and lack of distinguishing characteristics of the assessment comparables to the subject property. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(b). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The Board finds the parties submitted for the Board's consideration a total of fifteen suggested equity comparables with various degrees of similarity to the subject property. The Board gave less weight to appellant's comparable #1, #2, #3, #6, #7, #8, #9 and #10 due to these comparables being less proximate in distance from the subject property and being located in a different subdivision than the subject. The Board gave less weight to board of review comparables #4 due to its smaller dwelling size when compared to the subject.

The Board finds the best evidence of assessment equity to be appellant's comparable #4, #5 and #11 along with board of review comparables #1, #2 and #3. These comparables are most similar to the subject in location, dwelling size, design, age and most features. These most similar comparables had improvement assessments that ranged from \$70,963 to \$83,590 or from \$31.26 to \$34.81 per square foot of living area. The subject's improvement assessment of \$80,031 or \$34.25 per square foot of living area falls within the range established by the most similar comparables in this record. Therefore, no reduction in the subject's improvement assessment is warranted.

As to the appellant's rebuttal testimony and evidence, the Board has considered all comparables submitted by the parties and finds that the location of the parties' comparables in proximity to the subject goes to the **weight** of the evidence to be given to those comparables rather than the **admissibility** of the comparables into evidence. Moreover, the Board finds that it is not bound by the rules of any local board of review, but by the Property Tax Code and its own Rules under the Illinois Administrative Code Section 1910.50 which states in part:

a) All proceedings before the Property Tax Appeal Board shall be considered de novo meaning the Board will consider only the evidence, exhibits and briefs submitted to it, and will not give any weight or consideration to any prior actions by a local board of review or to any submissions not timely filed or not specifically made a part of the record. *The Board shall not be limited to the evidence presented to the board of review of the county. A party participating in*  the hearing before the Property Tax Appeal Board is entitled to introduce evidence that is otherwise proper and admissible without regard to whether that evidence has previously been introduced at a hearing before the board of review of the county. Each appeal shall be limited to the grounds listed in the petition filed with the Board. (emphasis original) (35 ILCS 200/16-180)

The fact that nine of the appellant's eleven comparables were located outside of the subject's neighborhood while all four of the board of review's comparables were within the subject's Heron Creek subdivision further detracts and undermines appellant's argument. Based on this record, the Board finds the appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the subject's improvement was inequitably assessed and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not justified.

The Supreme Court in <u>Apex Motor Fuel Co. v. Barrett</u>, 20 Ill. 2d 395, 169 N.E.2d 769, discussed the constitutional requirement of uniformity. The court stated that "[u]niformity in taxation, as required by the constitution, implied equality in the burden of taxation." (<u>Apex Motor Fuel</u>, 20 Ill. 2d at 401) The Court in <u>Apex Motor Fuel</u> further stated:

the rule of uniformity . . . prohibits the taxation of one kind of property within the taxing district at one value while the same kind of property in the same district for taxation purposes is valued at either a grossly less value or a grossly higher value. [citation omitted].

Within this constitutional limitation, however, the General Assembly has the power to determine the method by which property may be valued for tax purposes. The constitutional provision for uniformity does [not] call . . . for mathematical equality. The requirement is satisfied if the intent is evident to adjust the burden with a reasonable degree of uniformity and if such is the effect of the statute in its general operation. A practical uniformity, rather than an absolute one, is the test. [citation omitted]

<u>Apex Motor Fuel</u>, 20 Ill. 2d at 401. In this context, the court stated in <u>Kankakee County</u> that the cornerstone of uniform assessments is the fair cash value of the property in question. According to the court, uniformity is achieved only when all property with similar fair cash value is assessed at a consistent level. <u>Kankakee County Board of Review</u>, 131 Ill. 2d at 21.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code. Pursuant to Section 1910.50(d) of the rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board (86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.50(d)) the proceeding before the Property Tax Appeal Board is terminated when the decision is rendered. The Property Tax Appeal Board does not require any motion or request for reconsideration.

|               | Chairman   |
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| 21. Fer       | C R        |
| Member        | Member     |
| hover Stoffer | Dan Dikini |
| Member        | Member     |
| DISSENTING:   |            |

# <u>CERTIFICATION</u>

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date:

November 19, 2019

Mano Allorino

Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

### **IMPORTANT NOTICE**

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year or years of the same general assessment period, as provided in Sections 9-125 through 9-225, are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for such subsequent year or years directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A <u>PETITION AND</u> <u>EVIDENCE</u> WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR OR YEARS. A separate petition and evidence must be filed for each of the remaining years of the general assessment period.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.

# PARTIES OF RECORD

## AGENCY

State of Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board William G. Stratton Building, Room 402 401 South Spring Street Springfield, IL 62706-4001

### APPELLANT

John Mataitis 204 Northgate Sycamore , IL 60178

### COUNTY

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