



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Joseph Anetsberger
DOCKET NO.: 15-23192.001-R-1
PARCEL NO.: 14-19-104-002-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Joseph Anetsberger, the appellant(s), by attorney Michael E. Crane, of Crane and Norcross in Chicago; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented in this matter, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds **No Change** in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND: \$28,750
IMPR.: \$47,600
TOTAL: \$76,350

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2015 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject property is a 102 year-old, two-story, mixed-use building of masonry construction containing 5,600 square feet of living area. The building contained two commercial spaces on the first floor and two residential apartments on the upper floor. Features of the subject include a full unfinished basement and a three-car garage. The property has a 6,250 square foot site located in Chicago, Lake View Township, Cook County. The subject is a Class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

The appellant contends assessment inequity and overvaluation as the bases of the appeal¹. In support of the assessment inequity argument, the appellant submitted information on three suggested equity comparable properties.

In support of the overvaluation argument, the appellant submitted a brief and attachments in support of an income capitalization argument. The appellant appended Schedule E from the 2012 and 2014 Federal form 1040 tax returns and a current rent roll affidavit. The appellant argued that an 18.00% actual expense rate was within the acceptable market range for property of this type. The appellant did not deduct a vacancy allowance. The appellant selected an overall 12.92% capitalization rate to arrive at an income approach estimated market value of \$286,060.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$76,350. The subject property has an improvement assessment of \$47,600, or \$8.50 per square foot of living area. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$763,500, or \$136.34 per square foot of living area including land, when applying the 2015 level of assessment of 10.00% for Class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance. In support of its contention of the correct assessment, the board of review submitted information on four suggested equity comparable properties.

At hearing, the parties reiterated their respective arguments pertaining to assessment inequity. The appellant did not address the overvaluation argument at hearing. However, the appellant argued that the Board should reduce the 2015 assessment because the board of review reduced the 2016 assessment.

Conclusion of Law

The appellant contends assessment inequity as the basis of the appeal. When unequal treatment in the assessment process is the basis of the appeal, the inequity of the assessments must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of unequal treatment in the assessment process should consist of documentation of the assessments for the assessment year in question of not less than three comparable properties showing the similarity, proximity and lack of distinguishing characteristics of the assessment comparables to the subject property. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(b). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The Board finds the best evidence of assessment equity to be the appellant's comparable(s) #1, and the board of review's comparable(s) #2 and #4. These comparables had improvement assessments that ranged from \$8.04 to \$15.54 per square foot of living area. The subject's improvement assessment of \$8.50 per square foot of living area falls within the range established by the best comparable properties in this record. Based on this record, the Board finds the

¹ The appellant checked the boxes for Assessment Equity and Contention of Law in Section 2d of his Residential Appeal Petition. In addition to evidence in support of the Assessment Equity argument, the evidence the appellant submitted addressed an overvaluation argument based on application of the income capitalization approach.

appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the subject's improvement was inequitably assessed and holds that a reduction in the subject's assessment based on assessment inequity is not justified.

The appellant also contends the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal the value of the property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The appellant relied upon an income capitalization approach to establish overvaluation. In support of this argument, the appellant submitted a rent roll and actual income and expense information for tax years 2012 and 2014.

In Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill.2d 428 (1970), the Illinois Supreme Court stated:

[I]t is clearly the value of the "tract or lot of real property" which is assessed, rather than the value of the interest presently held by the owner... [R]ental income may of course be a relevant factor. However, it cannot be the controlling factor, particularly where it is admittedly misleading as to the fair cash value of the property involved... [E]arning capacity is properly regarded as the most significant element in arriving at "fair cash value"... [M]any factors may prevent a property owner from realizing an income from property which accurately reflects its true earning capacity; but it is the capacity for earning income, rather than the income actually derived, which reflects "fair cash value" for taxation purposes.

Id. at 430-31.

Actual expenses and income can be useful when shown that they are reflective of the market. Although the appellant made this argument, the appellant did not demonstrate that the subject's actual income and expenses are reflective of the market. To demonstrate or estimate the subject's market value using income, one must establish with market data: the market rent; vacancy and collection losses; and expenses to arrive at a net operating income reflective of the market and the property's capacity for earning income. The appellant did not provide such evidence. Therefore, the Board gives this argument no weight. Based on this evidence, the Board finds a reduction in the subject's assessment for overvaluation is not justified.

The appellant raised an argument for the first time at hearing to ask the Board to reduce the current lien year assessment because the board of review issued a 2016 assessment lower than the assessment in the instant appeal. This argument was not raised in the evidence and brief submission phase of the appeal. Nevertheless, the Board finds that there is no merit to the appellant's argument. Hoyne Savings & Loan Association v. Hare, 60 Ill.2d 84, 322 N.E.2d 833

(1974) and The 400 Condominium Association, et al., v. Tully, 79 Ill.App.3d 686, 398 N.E.2d 951 (1st Dist. 1979) stand for the proposition that an assessment reduction in a subsequent year requires an assessment reduction in the tax year at issue absent a glaring error in calculation. The Supreme Court in Hoyne observed that the facts in that case presented unusual circumstances coupled with a grossly excessive assessment increase from \$9,510 in 1970 to \$246,810 in 1971. Consequently, it remanded the case for the lower court to ascertain the correct assessed valuation. Hoyne, 60 Ill.2d at 89-90, 322 N.E.2d at 836-37.

The appellant's argument at hearing inverts the holdings in those cases. The Supreme Court in Hoyne never found the 1970 assessment to be in error; it found the 1971 assessment to be grossly excessive. In this case, the appellant argued the 2015 assessment was too high merely because the 2016 assessment was reduced by the board of review. The appellant failed to present any facts that suggest the board of review reduced the 2016 assessment because it was already grossly excessive. Even if the appellant were to present such facts, there is no basis to conclude that the 2015 assessment should, therefore, be reduced. The Appellate Court in Moroney v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 2013 Ill.App. (1st) 120493, distinguished Hoyne and 400 Condominium as confined to their unique facts. The Court rejected that appellant's argument that those prior cases stood for the proposition that "subsequent actions by assessing officials are fertile grounds to demonstrate a mistake in prior year's assessments." Moroney, 2013 Ill.App. 120493 at ¶46. There was no evidence in Moroney that there was any error in the calculation of the taxpayer's 2005 assessment. The Appellate Court observed, "just because factors warranting a reduction existed in 2006, does not mean they existed in 2005, or any other year for that matter (which is why property taxes are assessed every year)." *Id.* Accordingly, the Board finds no merit to the appellant's argument that it should reduce the 2015 assessment because the board of review issued a lower 2016 assessment.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code. Pursuant to Section 1910.50(d) of the rules of the Property Tax Appeal Board (86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.50(d)) the proceeding before the Property Tax Appeal Board is terminated when the decision is rendered. The Property Tax Appeal Board does not require any motion or request for reconsideration.

Chairman



Member

Member



Member

Member

DISSENTING: _____

CERTIFICATION

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date: June 18, 2019



Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year or years of the same general assessment period, as provided in Sections 9-125 through 9-225, are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for such subsequent year or years directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR OR YEARS. A separate petition and evidence must be filed for each of the remaining years of the general assessment period.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.

PARTIES OF RECORD

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