



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION  
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Mark Wiedelman  
DOCKET NO.: 13-26066.001-R-1  
PARCEL NO.: 03-04-204-073-1021

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Mark Wiedelman, the appellant, by attorney Michael R. Davies, of the Law Offices of Michael R. Davies, Ltd. in Oak Lawn; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented in this matter, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds A Reduction in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

**LAND:** \$1,220  
**IMPR.:** \$4,367  
**TOTAL:** \$5,587

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

**Statement of Jurisdiction**

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2013 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

**Findings of Fact**

The subject property consists of a 42-year-old condominium unit. The property has a 109,276 square foot site and is located in Wheeling Township, Cook County. The property is a class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of this argument the appellant submitted an appraisal estimating the subject property had a market value of \$45,000 as of March 29, 2013. Based on this evidence, the appellant requested a reduction in the subject's assessment to 10% of the appraisal value. In addition, the appellant submitted evidence disclosing the subject property was purchased on March 20, 2013 for a price of \$55,874.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$7,071. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$70,710

when applying the 2013 level of assessments for class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance of 10%.

In support of its contention of the correct assessment the board of review submitted an analysis estimating the market value of the subject property based on the sale of one other unit within the subject building. Based on the percentage of ownership of the unit that sold, the board of review found the full value of the entire building. Multiplying the subject's percentage of ownership by the full value of the building, the board of review found the market value of the subject.

At hearing, appellant's counsel reiterated the market value argument. Counsel argued the appraisal is the best evidence of market value in the record. The board of review argued the subject's 2013 sale was a compulsory sale and not reflective of the market value. In addition, the board of review argued the Board should give diminished weight to the appellant's appraisal because five of the comparables are REO properties and one of the comparables is a short sale.

### **Conclusion of Law**

The appellant contends the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal the value of the property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant met this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted.

The appellant's appraiser was not present at hearing to testify as to his qualifications, identify his work, testify about the contents of the evidence, the conclusions or be cross-examined by the board of review and the Board. In Novicki v. Department of Finance, 373 Ill.342, 26 N.E.2d 130 (1940), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, "[t]he rule against hearsay evidence, that a witness may testify only as to facts within his personal knowledge and not as to what someone else told him, is founded on the necessity of an opportunity for cross-examination, and is basic and not a technical rule of evidence." Novicki, 373 Ill. at 344. In Oak Lawn Trust & Savings Bank v. City of Palos Heights, 115 Ill.App.3d 887, 450 N.E.2d 788, 71 Ill.Dec. 100 (1st Dist. 1983) the appellate court held that the admission of an appraisal into evidence prepared by an appraiser not present at the hearing was in error. The appellate court found the appraisal to be hearsay that did not come within any exception to the hearsay rule, thus inadmissible against the defendant, and the circuit court erred in admitting the appraisal into evidence. Id.

In Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill.2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879, 86 Ill.Dec. 500 (1985), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the hearsay evidence rule applies to the administrative proceedings under the Unemployment Insurance Act. The court stated, however, hearsay evidence that is admitted without objection may be considered by the administrative body and by the courts on review. Jackson 105. In this case, the Board sua sponte finds that the appraisal is hearsay under Section 1910.90(g) of the Property Tax Appeal Board rules. Therefore, the Board gives no weight to the conclusions of value in the appraisal. However, the Board will consider the raw sales data submitted by the parties.

In determining the fair market value of the subject property, the Board looks to the evidence presented by the parties. Based on the evidence and testimony, the appellant's recent sale is found to be a compulsory sale.

A "compulsory sale" is defined as

(i) the sale of real estate for less than the amount owed to the mortgage lender or mortgagor, if the lender or mortgagor has agreed to the sale, commonly referred to as a "short sale" and (ii) the first sale of real estate owned by a financial institution as a result of a judgment of foreclosure, transfer pursuant to a deed in lieu of foreclosure, or consent judgment, occurring after the foreclosure proceeding is complete.

35 ILCS 200/1-23. Real property in Illinois must be assessed at its fair cash value, which can only be estimated absent any compulsion on either party.

Illinois law requires that all real property be valued at its fair cash value, estimated at the price it would bring at a fair voluntary sale where the owner is ready, willing, and able to sell but not compelled to do so, and the buyer is likewise ready, willing, and able to buy, but is not forced to do so.

Board of Educ. of Meridian Community Unit School Dist. No. 223 v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 961 N.E.2d 794, 802, 356 Ill.Dec. 405, 413 (2d Dist. 2011) (citing Chrysler Corp. v. Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board, 69 Ill.App.3d 207, 211, 387 N.E.2d 351 (2d Dist. 1979)).

However, the Illinois General Assembly recently provided very clear guidance for the Board with regards to compulsory sales. Section 16-183 of the Illinois Property Tax Code states as follows:

The Property Tax Appeal Board shall consider compulsory sales of comparable properties for the purpose of revising and correcting assessments, including those compulsory sales of comparable properties submitted by the taxpayer.

35 ILCS 200/16-183. Therefore, the Board is statutorily required to consider the compulsory sales of comparable properties which were submitted by the parties. In considering the compulsory sale of the subject property, the Board looks to both the appellant's evidence and the board of review's comparables. The Board finds that the appellant submitted six comparables and the board of review submitted one comparable property. The Board finds that the subject's 2013 sale falls within the range of sales comparables in the record. Therefore, the Board finds the subject's 2013 sale is reflective of the market value.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.



Chairman



Member



Acting Member



Member



Acting Member

DISSENTING: \_\_\_\_\_

CERTIFICATION

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date: June 23, 2017



Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

**IMPORTANT NOTICE**

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of

the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.