

FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

APPELLANT: Chris Molski
DOCKET NO.: 11-29645.001-R-1
PARCEL NO.: 17-05-319-074-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Chris Molski, the appellant, by attorney Jason T. Shilson, of O'Keefe Lyons & Hynes, LLC in Chicago; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented in this matter, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds *No Change* in the assessment of the property as established by the **Cook** County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND: \$10,880 **IMPR.:** \$57,204 **TOTAL:** \$68,084

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2011 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject property consists of 2 multi-family dwellings. Improvement #1 is a three-story building of masonry construction with 2,160 square feet of living area. Improvement #2 is a two-story building of masonry construction with 2,436 square feet of living area. Both buildings are 122 years old. Improvement #1 has a full unfinished basement and Improvement #2 has a crawl-space foundation. The property is located in Chicago, West Chicago Township, Cook County. The subject property is classified as class 2-11 apartment buildings under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

The appellant contends overvaluation and assessment inequity as the bases of the appeal. In support of the overvaluation argument the appellant submitted an income approach to value the subject. In support of the assessment inequity argument, the appellant submitted information on

six comparables for improvement #2. The appellant failed to disclose any information regarding improvement #1 and submitted no comparables for analysis.¹

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$68,084. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$680,840 or \$148.14 per square foot of living area including land, when using a total of 4,596 square feet of living area and when applying the level of assessment for class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance of 10%. Improvement #1 has an improvement assessment of \$27,093 or \$12.54 per square foot of living area. Improvement #2 has an improvement assessment of \$30,111 or \$12.36 per square foot of living area. In support of its contention of the correct assessment the board of review submitted information on four comparables for improvement #1 and three comparables for improvement #2.

Conclusion of Law

The appellant contends in part, that the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal the value of the property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and no reduction in the subject's assessment is warranted on grounds of overvaluation.

The Board finds the appellant's argument that the subject's assessment is excessive when applying an income approach based on the subject's actual income and expenses unconvincing and not supported by evidence in the record. In <u>Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal</u> Board, 44 Ill.2d 428 (1970), the court stated:

it is the value of the "tract or lot of real property" property which is assessed, rather than the value of the interest presently held. . . [R]ental income may of course be a relevant factor. However, it cannot be the controlling factor, particularly where it is admittedly misleading as to the fair cash value of the property involved. . . [E]arning capacity is properly regarded as the most significant element in arriving at "fair cash value".

Many factors may prevent a property owner from realizing an income from property, which accurately reflects its true earning capacity; but it is the capacity for earning income, rather than the income actually derived, which reflects "fair cash value" for taxation purposes. <u>Id</u>.

Actual expenses and income can be useful when shown that they are reflective of the market. The appellant did not demonstrate that the subject's actual income and expenses were reflective of the market. To demonstrate or estimate the subject's market value using an income approach, as the appellant attempted, one must establish through the use of market data the market rent, vacancy and collection losses, and expenses to arrive at a net operating income. Further, the

¹ The appellant's equity grid erroneously divided the subject's total improvement assessment by the square footage of improvement #2 only.

appellant must establish through the use of market data a capitalization rate to convert the net income into an estimate of market value. The appellant did not follow this procedure in developing the income approach to value; therefore, the Property Tax Appeal Board gives this argument no weight.

The Board further finds that the income approach analysis submitted appears to have been executed by the appellant's attorney. The Board finds it problematic the fact that appellant's counsel developed the "income analysis" rather than an expert in the field of real estate valuation. The Board finds that an attorney cannot act as both an advocate for a client and also provide unbiased, objective value evidence for that client's property.

In conclusion, the Board finds no change in the assessment of the subject is warranted based on the appellant's submission due to overvaluation.

The taxpayer also contends assessment inequity as an alternative basis of the appeal. When unequal treatment in the assessment process is the basis of the appeal, the inequity of the assessments must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of unequal treatment in the assessment process should consist of documentation of the assessments for the assessment year in question of not less than three comparable properties showing the similarity, proximity and lack of distinguishing characteristics of the assessment comparables to the subject property. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(b). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The Board finds the only evidence of assessment equity for improvement #1 is the board of review's comparables. These comparables had improvement assessments that ranged from \$14.93 to \$23.60 per square foot of living area. The subject's assessment for improvement #1 of \$12.54 per square foot of living area falls below the range established by the only comparables in this record regarding this improvement and appears to be under assessed.

The Board finds the best evidence of assessment equity for improvement #2 is the appellant's comparables #1, #5, #6 and the board of review's comparables. These comparables had improvement assessments that ranged from \$12.13 to \$23.60 per square foot of living area. The subject's assessment for improvement #2 of \$12.36 per square foot of living area falls within the range established by the best comparables in this record. The Board gave less weight to the appellant's remaining comparables regarding improvement #2 due to their considerably larger or smaller sizes, when compared to the subject's improvement #2. Based on this record the Board finds the appellant did not demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the subject's improvement was inequitably assessed and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not justified.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

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| DISSENTING: | |

<u>CERTIFICATIO</u>N

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

| Date: | November 23, 2016 |
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| | Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board |

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of

the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A <u>PETITION AND EVIDENCE</u> WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.