

FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

APPELLANT:	Urban Partnershiip Bank
DOCKET NO.:	11-26948.001-R-1
PARCEL NO .:	25-14-101-007-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Urban Partnershiip Bank, the appellant(s), by attorney Michael R. Davies, of the Law Offices of Michael R. Davies, Ltd. in Oak Lawn; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented in this matter, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds <u>No Change</u> in the assessment of the property as established by the **Cook** County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND:	\$ 3,277
IMPR.:	\$ 8,163
TOTAL:	\$11,440

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2011 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject property consists of a 121-year-old, two-story dwelling of masonry construction with 1,585 square feet of living area. The property has a 2,731 square foot site and is located in Hyde Park Township, Cook County. The property is a class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of this argument the appellant submitted an appraisal estimating the subject property had a market value of \$15,000 as of January 26, 2012.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$11,440. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$114,400 or \$72.18 per square foot of living area, including land, when applying the 2011 level

of assessments for class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance of 10%.

In support of its contention of the correct assessment the board of review submitted information on four suggested equity comparables with sales data on each property.

At hearing, appellant's attorney argued appellant's appraisal is the best evidence of market value in the record. The Board sustained an objection by the board of review that the appraiser is not present to testify as to the appraisal's conclusions. In addition, the board of review argued the appraisal's comparables were all REO cash sales and should be given diminished weight.

Conclusion of Law

The appellant contends the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal the value of the property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The appellant's appraiser was not present at hearing to testify as to his qualifications, identify his work, testify about the contents of the evidence, the conclusions or be cross-examined by the board of review and the Board. In <u>Novicki v. Department of Finance</u>, 373 Ill.342, 26 N.E.2d 130 (1940), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, "[t]he rule against hearsay evidence, that a witness may testify only as to facts within his personal knowledge and not as to what someone else told him, is founded on the necessity of an opportunity for cross-examination, and is basic and not a technical rule of evidence." <u>Novicki</u>, 373 Ill. at 344. In <u>Oak Lawn Trust & Savings Bank v. City of Palos Heights</u>, 115 Ill.App.3d 887, 450 N.E.2d 788, 71 Ill.Dec. 100 (1st Dist. 1983) the appellate court held that the admission of an appraisal into evidence prepared by an appraiser not present at the hearing was in error. The appellate court found the appraisal to be hearsay that did not come within any exception to the hearsay rule, thus inadmissible against the defendant, and the circuit court erred in admitting the appraisal into evidence. Id.

In Jackson v. Board of Review of the Department of Labor, 105 Ill.2d 501, 475 N.E.2d 879, 86 Ill.Dec. 500 (1985), the Supreme Court of Illinois held that the hearsay evidence rule applies to the administrative proceedings under the Unemployment Insurance Act. The court stated, however, hearsay evidence that is admitted without objection may be considered by the administrative body and by the courts on review. Jackson 105 objected to the appraisal as hearsay. Therefore, the Board finds the appraisal hearsay and the adjustments and conclusions of value are given no weight. However, the Board will consider the raw sales data submitted by the parties.

The Illinois General Assembly recently provided very clear guidance for the Board with regards to compulsory sales. Section 16-183 of the Illinois Property Tax Code states as follows:

The Property Tax Appeal Board shall consider compulsory sales of comparable properties for the purpose of revising and correcting assessments, including those compulsory sales of comparable properties submitted by the taxpayer.

35 ILCS 200/16-183. Therefore, the Board is statutorily required to consider the compulsory sales of comparable properties which were submitted by the parties. The Board finds that the parties submitted a total of seven sales comparables.

The Board finds the best evidence of market value to be appellant's comparable sales #1, #2, and #3, and the board of review's comparable #1. These comparables sold for prices ranging from \$10.42 to \$105.60 per square foot of living area, including land. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$72.18 per square foot of living area, including land, which is within the range established by the best comparable sales in this record. Based on this evidence, the Board finds a reduction in the subject's assessment to appellant's requested assessment is not justified.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

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DISSENTING:

CERTIFICATION

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date:

October 21, 2016

Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of

the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A <u>PETITION AND</u> <u>EVIDENCE</u> WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.