

FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD

APPELLANT: Gus Papadakis DOCKET NO.: 09-31722.001-R-1 PARCEL NO.: 05-31-102-012-0000

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Gus Papadakis, the appellant(s), by attorney George N. Reveliotis, of Reveliotis Law, P.C. in Chicago; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds <u>no change</u> in the assessment of the property as established by the **Cook** County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

LAND:	\$ 48,843
IMPR.:	\$ 59,574
TOTAL:	\$ 108,417

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2009 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board (the "Board") finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject consists of а two-story dwelling of frame construction with 3,813 square feet of living area. The dwelling is 81 years old. Features of the home include a partial basement with a formal recreation room and central air conditioning. The property has a 54,270 square foot site, and is located in Glenview, New Trier Township, Cook County. The subject is classified as a class 2-12 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

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The appellant contends overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of this argument the appellant submitted an appraisal estimating the subject property had a market value of \$380,000 as of January 1, 2007.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$108,417. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$1,218,169, or \$319.48 per square foot of living area, including land, when applying the 2009 three year average median level of assessment for class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance of 8.90% as determined by the Illinois Department of Revenue.

In support of its contention of the correct assessment, the board of review submitted information on four equity comparables.

At hearing, counsel for the appellant reaffirmed the evidence previously submitted. The board of review analyst objected, as the appraiser: was not present; did not testify and was unavailable for cross-examination. Therefore, it was argued, the appraisal should be dismissed as hearsay evidence. The Board sustained the objection on hearsay grounds, but allowed counsel for the appellant to make argument regarding the raw sales data submitted in the sales comparison approach of the appraisal, which was done.

During the board of review's case-in-chief, the analyst asked the Board to take judicial notice of the Board's decision in docket number 07-22376.001-R-1, wherein the subject's assessment was maintained. In that appeal, the appellant submitted the same appraisal that was submitted in this appeal. The Board took judicial notice of this decision under 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.90(i). The analyst then reaffirmed the evidence previously submitted.

In rebuttal, counsel for the appellant argued that the board of review's evidence made no adjustments, and should be given diminished weight by the Board.

Conclusion of Law

The appellant contends the market value of the subject property is not accurately reflected in its assessed valuation. When market value is the basis of the appeal the value of the property must be proved by a preponderance of the evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of market value may consist of an appraisal of the subject property, a recent sale, comparable sales or construction costs. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(c). The Board finds the appellant did not meet this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not warranted.

The Board does not find the appraisal submitted by the appellant persuasive. At hearing, the board of review analyst argued that the appraisal was hearsay evidence because the appraiser was not available to testify. The Board finds this to be the case. For proceedings before the Board, "[t]he procedure, to the extent that the Board considers practicable, shall eliminate formal rules of pleading, practice and evidence, . . ." 35 ILCS 200/16-180. However, in Novicki v. Department of Finance, 373 Ill.342, 26 N.E.2d 130 (1940), the Supreme Court of Illinois stated, "[t]he rule against hearsay evidence, that a witness may testify only as to facts within his personal knowledge and not as to what someone else told him, is founded on the necessity of an opportunity for cross-examination, and is basic and not a technical rule of evidence." Novicki, 373 Ill. at 344. Thus, while the Board's rules allow for informal rules of evidence, the Board cannot abrogate a basic rule of evidence under the Supreme Court's holding in Novicki. Therefore, the Board finds that the appraisal is hearsay evidence for which no exception exists, and that the appraisal shall not be considered as relevant evidence in this appeal. However, the Board will analyze the raw sales data submitted by the parties.

The Board finds the best evidence of market value to be appellant's comparable #4 found in the sales comparison approach in the appraisal. This comparable sold for \$101.25 per square foot of building area, including land. The subject's assessment reflects a market value of \$319.48 per square foot of building area, including land, which is above the range established by the best comparable in this record. However, after adjustments, the Board finds that the subject's assessment should not be adjusted, as the subject's land size is 14 times larger than comparable #4. Based on this record, the Board finds that the subject is not overvalued, and a reduction in the subject's assessment is not justified. This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

Chairman

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Member

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DISSENTING:

Member

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CERTIFICATION

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date:

May 22, 2015

Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

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"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A <u>PETITION AND EVIDENCE</u> WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.