



**FINAL ADMINISTRATIVE DECISION
ILLINOIS PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD**

APPELLANT: Michael Fazio
DOCKET NO.: 09-25340.001-R-1 through 09-25340.002-R-1
PARCEL NO.: See Below

The parties of record before the Property Tax Appeal Board are Michael Fazio, the appellant, by attorney Richard J. Caldarazzo, of Mar Cal Law, P.C. in Chicago; and the Cook County Board of Review.

Based on the facts and exhibits presented, the Property Tax Appeal Board hereby finds no change in the assessment of the property as established by the Cook County Board of Review is warranted. The correct assessed valuation of the property is:

DOCKET NO	PARCEL NUMBER	LAND	IMPRVMT	TOTAL
09-25340.001-R-1	12-24-324-026-0000	5,019	24,519	\$29,538
09-25340.002-R-1	12-24-324-027-0000	3,780	24,519	\$28,299

Subject only to the State multiplier as applicable.

Statement of Jurisdiction

The appellant timely filed the appeal from a decision of the Cook County Board of Review pursuant to section 16-160 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/16-160) challenging the assessment for the 2009 tax year. The Property Tax Appeal Board finds that it has jurisdiction over the parties and the subject matter of the appeal.

Findings of Fact

The subject property consists of a 61-year-old, two-story building of masonry construction with 7,567 square feet of living area prorated equally between two parcels. The property has a total of 6,285 square foot site and is located in Jefferson Township, Cook County. The subject is classified as a

class 2 property under the Cook County Real Property Assessment Classification Ordinance.

The appellant contends assessment inequity and overvaluation as the basis of the appeal. In support of the inequity argument, the appellant submitted information on two suggested equity comparables.

In support of the overvaluation argument, the appellant submitted data showing income and expense information for the subject. The appellant's attorney submitted a brief applying an attorney developed capitalization rate to the subject's actual income to arrive at an attorney estimated value for the subject.

The appellant additionally argued, without citing any authority, that the subject's assessment should be lowered because the property had a 31% vacancy rate for 2009. At hearing, appellant's attorney stated that the appellant was unable to find tenants for the commercial space in the building from October through December, 2009.

The board of review submitted its "Board of Review Notes on Appeal" disclosing the total assessment for the subject of \$57,837. The subject property has an improvement assessment of \$49,038. In support of its contention of the correct assessment the board of review submitted information on three suggested equity comparables. At hearing, the board of review argued that there is no evidence that the property was uninhabitable as opposed to simply not rented out. In support of this assertion, the board of review provided a courtesy copy of 35 ILCS 200/9-180.

Conclusion of Law

The appellant submitted documentation showing the income of the subject property. The Board gives the appellant's argument little weight. In Springfield Marine Bank v. Property Tax Appeal Board, 44 Ill.2d 428 (1970), the court stated:

[I]t is the value of the "tract or lot of real property" which is assessed, rather than the value of the interest presently held. . . [R]ental income may of course be a relevant factor. However, it cannot be the controlling factor, particularly where it is admittedly misleading as to the fair cash value of the property involved. . . [E]arning capacity is properly

regarded as the most significant element in arriving at "fair cash value".

Many factors may prevent a property owner from realizing an income from property that accurately reflects its true earning capacity; but it is the capacity for earning income, rather than the income actually derived, which reflects "fair cash value" for taxation purposes. Id. at 431.

Actual expenses and income can be useful when shown that they are reflective of the market. Although the appellant's attorney made this argument, the appellant did not demonstrate through an expert in real estate valuation that the subject's actual income and expenses are reflective of the market. To demonstrate or estimate the subject's market value using income, one must establish, through the use of market data, the market rent, vacancy and collection losses, and expenses to arrive at a net operating income reflective of the market and the property's capacity for earning income. The appellant did not provide such evidence and, therefore, the Board gives this argument no weight and that a reduction based on market value is not warranted.

The taxpayer contends assessment inequity as the basis of the appeal. When unequal treatment in the assessment process is the basis of the appeal, the inequity of the assessments must be proved by clear and convincing evidence. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.63(e). Proof of unequal treatment in the assessment process should consist of documentation of the assessments for the assessment year in question of not less than three comparable properties showing the similarity, proximity and lack of distinguishing characteristics of the assessment comparables to the subject property. 86 Ill.Admin.Code §1910.65(b). The Board finds the appellant *did not meet* this burden of proof and a reduction in the subject's assessment *is not warranted*.

The Board finds the best evidence of assessment equity to be *appellant's comparable #2 and the board of review's comparables #2 and #3*. These comparables had improvement assessments that ranged from \$6.42 to \$8.02 per square foot of living area. The subject's improvement assessment of \$6.48 per square foot of living area falls within the range established by the best comparables in this record. Based on this record the Board finds the appellant *did not* demonstrate with clear and convincing evidence that the subject's improvement was inequitably assessed and a reduction in the subject's assessment *is not justified*.

The Board finds that the appellant submitted insufficient documentation to show that the subject was uninhabitable or unfit for occupancy as required by Section 9-180 of the Property Tax Code, Section 9-180 of the Property Tax Code provide in part:

The owner of the property on January 1 shall be liable, on a proportionate basis, for the increased taxes occasioned by the construction of new or added buildings, structures or other improvements on the property from the date when the occupancy permit was issued from the date the new or added improvement was inhabitable and fit for occupancy or for intended customary use to December 31 of that year.." (35 ILCS200/9-180).


35 ILCS 200/9-180. The Board finds no evidence in the record that the subject's assessment is incorrect when vacancy is considered. The mere assertion that vacancies in a property exist, does not constitute proof that the assessment is incorrect or that the fair market value of a property is negatively impacted. There was no showing that the subject's market value was impacted by its vacancy during 2009. Furthermore, the appellant failed to show that the subject was not uninhabitable or unfit for occupancy. The appellant merely stated that there was a 31% vacancy for 2009.

This is a final administrative decision of the Property Tax Appeal Board which is subject to review in the Circuit Court or Appellate Court under the provisions of the Administrative Review Law (735 ILCS 5/3-101 et seq.) and section 16-195 of the Property Tax Code.

Chairman



Member



Member

Member



Member

DISSENTING: _____

C E R T I F I C A T I O N

As Clerk of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board and the keeper of the Records thereof, I do hereby certify that the foregoing is a true, full and complete Final Administrative Decision of the Illinois Property Tax Appeal Board issued this date in the above entitled appeal, now of record in this said office.

Date: April 24, 2015



Clerk of the Property Tax Appeal Board

IMPORTANT NOTICE

Section 16-185 of the Property Tax Code provides in part:

"If the Property Tax Appeal Board renders a decision lowering the assessment of a particular parcel after the deadline for filing complaints with the Board of Review or after adjournment of the session of the Board of Review at which assessments for the subsequent year are being considered, the taxpayer may, within 30 days after the date of written notice of the Property Tax Appeal Board's decision, appeal the assessment for the subsequent year directly to the Property Tax Appeal Board."

In order to comply with the above provision, YOU MUST FILE A PETITION AND EVIDENCE WITH THE PROPERTY TAX APPEAL BOARD WITHIN 30 DAYS OF THE DATE OF THE ENCLOSED DECISION IN ORDER TO APPEAL THE ASSESSMENT OF THE PROPERTY FOR THE SUBSEQUENT YEAR.

Based upon the issuance of a lowered assessment by the Property Tax Appeal Board, the refund of paid property taxes is the responsibility of your County Treasurer. Please contact that office with any questions you may have regarding the refund of paid property taxes.